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Recognition tests are a very popular means of assessing the memory effectiveness
of advertisements. Unfortunately the recognition scores obtoined by current methods
reflect both the memory for an advertisement and the response biases of the re-
spondents. The outhors introduce the theory of signol detection (TSD) v/hich can be
used to secure independent estimates of memory and response bias in recognition
tests. They discuss hov/ TSD can be used to improve ad recognition testing.
Using the Theory of Signal Detection to
Improve Ad Recognition Testing
Of the several methods for measuring the impact of
printed advertisements, one of the most widely used is
the recognition method (Singh and Rothschild 1983). "The
critical thing that defines a recognition task is that the
person is given a copy of the information he or she needs
to find in memory" (Glass. Holyoak, and Santa 1979,
p. 59). In a typical recognition test, such as performed
by Starch/INRA/Hooper, subjects are shown a series of
advertisements, one at a time. As each advertisement ap-
pears, the subjects are to respond "yes" if they think
they have seen the ad earlier and "no" if not. In spite
of their popularity, these recognition tests are shrouded
in controversy. Appel and Blum (1961) and Marder and
David (1961) pointed out long ago, for example, that a
large percentage of respondents will claim recognition
of bogus ads (ads respondents could not have seen be-
fore) contained in magazines when real ads are also being
tested. In some studies, the claimed level of recognition
for bogus ads has been almost as high as that for real
ads (Simmons 1961).
The tendency to "recognize ads," irrespective of prior
exposure to them, may be due to "acquiescence response
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set" bias, that is, the genera! tendency to favor affirm-
ative responses over negative responses apart from the
content of the items at issue. In yes/no or true/false
tests, for example, more individuals give an excess num-
ber of "yes" or "true" responses (Cronbach 1950; Guil-
ford 1967). Acquiescence set bias has been called "not-
ing set" (Appel and Blum 1961) or "yea-saying" (Wells
1961) bias in the advertising context.
Noting set bias is only one variable contributing to
excessively high ad noting scores. Among the other fac-
tors that affect ad recognition scores are guessing when
uncertain, eagerness to please the interviewer, hesitation
to appear ignorant, and the tendency to deny socially
undesirable traits and to admit to socially desirable ones
(Clancy, Ostlund, and Wyner 1979: Lucas and Britt 1963).
Several methods have been suggested over the years
for making recognition tests more valid. Most of these
methods rely on the inclusion of "false" (bogus) ads along
with true "stimulus" ads in the test. The methods differ
primarily in terms of how the distractor ads are used.
One variation exposes a control group of subjects to a
portfolio of distractor ads to develop a benchmark of the
degree of false claiming, which is then used to adjust
the claimed recognition scores of subjects exposed to the
stimulus ads (Appel and Blum 1961; Lucas 1942; Sim-
mons 1961). Another variation involves informing re-
spondents about the presence of bogus ads to make them
aware that they cannot indiscriminately claim recogni-
tion of items (Clancy, Ostlund, and Wyner 1979; Neu
1961). A third variation directs respondents to choose
the stimulus ad from among one or more distractor ads
(Moran 1951a,b; Singh and Rothschild 1983). Unfor-
tunately, all of these methods have been found to have
major weaknesses—increased cost, adjusted recognition
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scores that are negative (a logical impossibility), and the
fact that the choice of distractor ads can affect the ob-
tained scores. In effect, none of the methods is able to
produce a recognition measure that could be considered
a true indicator of recognition memory.
The purpose of our article is to present the basics of
signal detection theory, which offers promise in provid-
ing a measure of recognition memory uncontaminated by
the response tendencies of subjects. We begin with a brief
review of the theory of signal detection (TSD). Next we
discuss the results from two experiments that examine
some propositions from TSD in an advertising context.
Finally, we describe the implications and limitations of
the theory of signal detection when used to assess the
effectiveness of print ads.
THEORY OF SIGNAL DEJECTION
TSD originated in World War II as psychologists were
trying to make ground observers of enemy planes more
accurate. It later was used in electrical engineering to
aid in the design of sensing devices (Peterson, Birdsall,
and Fox 1954; Van Meter and Middleton 1954), as well
as in many areas of psychology because it can be applied
to any situation where sensory input is ambiguous. (For
a general overview of the many types of situations to
which TSD has been applied, see Green and Swets 1966).
The key notions in TSD can be understood from its
application to recognition testing of memory. In a typicai
recognition memory test, the subject is presented with a
list of items (e.g., words) one at a time, some of which
he or she has been exposed to in an earlier session and
others of which are distractors. As each item is pre-
sented, the subject is to respond "yes" if he or she thinks
that the item was on the original list and "no" if not.
Subjects are told beforehand the proportions of items that
were on the original list and of items that are distractors.
Items to which subjects have been exposed previously
should be familiar to them; in signal detection language,
old or familiar items are called "signals" or "stimulus
items" and new or distractor items are called "noise"
(Banks 1970). Subjects can be paid for every correct re-
sponse and can be penalized for every incorrect re-
sponse, typically by withholding the reward. Usually
nonmonetary rewards (e.g., eagerness to please the in-
terviewer, hesitation to appear ignorant, and so on) also
are operating which affect the answers given by the sub-
ject.
1 There are four possible outcomes to every trial—the
subject may say either that the word was familiar or that
it was new and the trial may have been either signal or
noise. A hit response is one in which the subject says
"yes" to the presence of a signal and signal was actually
present; a miss occurs when the subject says "no," but
the signal was present; a false alarm occurs when the
subject reports the presence of a signal but in reality the
trial contained noise alone; and a correct rejection oc-
curs when the subject says no signal was present and the
trial actually did not have a signal. Notice that the sum
of the probabilities of hit and miss must equal ! .00; sim-
ilarly, the sum of the probabilities of false alarm and
correct rejection must add to 1.00. Altematively, the
probability of total yes and no responses given the signal
was or was not present must sum to 1.00. Because of
this complementary relationship between the responses,
only two responses customarily are used to summarize
a subject's performance—the hit and false alarm ratios.
The performance of a subject in the recognition test
depends mainly on two factors, the subject's ability to
perform the task and the subject's motivational state and
response tendencies (Pastore and Scheirer 1974). The
experimenter can affect the subject's response tenden-
cies and motivations by changing payoffs and/or by
changing prior odds. For example, in a word recognition
test, if the subject is aware that there is no penalty for
incorrect answers, he or she would pmbably have a greater
motivation for guessing than if wrong answers were scored
negatively. However, the subject's discrimination ability
should remain unaffected by changes in motivational
factors. Unfortunately, these two aspects—the sensory
or discrimination capabilities of the subject and his or
her dec is ion-making style (e.g.. the effect of his or her
values, motivations, knowledge of prior odds, and so
on)—are completely confounded in the responses se-
cured from the subject.
The basic aim and unique contribution of the TSD is the
separation of the sensory capabilities of the subject from
the individual's decision-making aspects and the preciise
estimation of each (Coombs. Dawes, and Tversky 1970.
p. 166).
Assumptions of TSD in the Study of Memory
The first assumption of TSD is that any information
an individual possesses has a certain strength in long-
term memory. The strength of the item can be taken as
the strength of a memory trace for it. Altematively. it
can refer to the degree of familiarity; the more familiar
an item is, the greater would be the memory strength for
it and vice versa. A second convenient assumption for
the time being is that measurements of the strength of
items, both old and new. are normally distributed and
have equal variances. This means in essence that there
are two normal distributions for subjects to consider, one
representing the list of familiar items and one repre-
senting the list of distractor items. The assumptions of
normality and equal variance were made in the original
development of the theory and are useful for illustrating
the essential notions.' They are no longer necessary,
however, because the key statistics that come out of the
normal theory approach have parallels requiring no as-
sumptions about the underlying distributions. Conse-
quently, we use the normal distribution and equal vari-
'For a theoretical argument as to why the distributions should be
normal, see Egan and Clarke (1966).
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ance assumptions to highlight the basic arguments and
key interpretive quantities of TSD, though we use their
distri but ion-free counterparts in discussing the results of
our experiments.
Finally, TSD assumes that an individual's exposure to
an item increases its strength in long-term memory. In
other words, both the stimuli and distractor items have
certain strength value to begin with, but the strength value
is changed with exposure to the item during the exper-
iment. Consider the full set of items making up a test.
Some of them might have been very familiar to the sub-
ject previously, some might have been very unfamiliar,
and still others might have been moderately familiar. Be-
cause the subject is exposed to the stimulus items (but
not the distractor items) before the test, they increase in
strength value in comparison with the distractor items,
which remain at their initial strength. In effect, the dis-
tribution of old items on the familiarity continuum is
moved to the right by a fixed amount (for the rationale
supporting these assumptions, see Klatzky 1980).
When faced with an item on a recognition task, the
subject must decide whether the item is old (stimulus)
or new (distractor), that is, did it come from the distri-
bution of old items/.(x) or from the distribution of new
items/«(A:). Figure 1,A depicts the situation.
The familiarity continuum is plotted on the abscissa
in Figure l:f',.ix) is to the right of/,,U) because most old
items would have greater familiarity value (or memory
strength) than new items. There is some overlap between
the distributions, however, because though the mean
strength of old items would be greater than that of new
items, some new items may have higher memory strength
than some old items." The distance between the means
of the two distributions is a measure of how far apart
the two are on the familiarity continuum. Each famil-
iarity value X has two probability densities attached to
it—one from the new and one from the old distribution.
Hence, each .v value on the familiarity continuum may





The likelihood ratio thus reflects the likelihood that a
particular item belongs to the class of old items relative
to the likelihood that it belongs to the class of new items
(Swets, Tanner, and Birdsall 1964).
Notice that while the numerator and denominator of the
likelihood ratio are the probabilities of an observation un-
'In an advertising recognition test the question being asked is. "Did
you ever encounter this ad in this particular issue of this publication
(magazine/newspaper, etc.)?" This is essentially a test of episodic
memory instead of semantic memory, for which the appropriate ques-
tion would be, "Have you ever encountered this ad before?" (Wallace
1980). Thus it is possible thai a subject may be more familiar with
certain distractor ads because of prior exposure to them in publications
other than the one being evaluated.
Figure 1
SOME KEY NOTIONS ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF
OLD AND NEW ITEMS
A. Probability Density Functions of Old and Nef Itema
Kamiliarity (or strength)
Continuum
B. Inpact of Cutoff Value x (Critical Value of x CorreBpondlng
to 1(K) = B) Glvan a Csrtaln Set of ClrouBataooBs
i (x) - Distraccor
Items
f (x) - Stimulus
° Items
V (or strength)
C. Visual Bepresantatlon of D'
Familiarity (or strength)
Continuum
dcr two different hypotheses, the likelihood ratio is a
number not a probability. The number is a function of
whatever variables were involved in the observation, but
\(x) is itself only a single variable. We may say. then,
that the decision axis becomes the likelihood ratio and
the axis is continuous and unidimensional (Corso 1967).
According to TSD, in other words, a subject does not
base his or her decision on the value of the raw sensory
input X,. but rather on a transformation of it to a new
decision axis, the likelihood ratio. When the subject is
presented with an item to which he or she must respond
"old" or "new," the individual acts as though he or she
were computing the likelihood ratio associated with some
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fixed criterion value of \{x) called p. If {(x) >: j3, the
subject responds "old" or "yes, the item is familiar";
otherwise "new," or "no, 1 have not seen the item be-
fore." p thus represents a threshold for saying "yes."
A similar argument can be developed for ad recog-
nition experiments. Consider, for example, the question
of whether a subject has been exposed to a particular ad
in a specific issue of a magazine. When traced with a
recognition task, the subject must decide whether he or
she has seen the item or advertisement before in the
magazine issue in question, that is, whether the item is
an old or stimulus item. Now the item could have come
from the distribution of old items,/,(J:), or it could have
come from the distribution of new items,/,(x). Figure
I,A again captures the situation;/O(J:) is again plotted to
the right of/n(;c) because most ads in the test issue would
have greater familiarity value (or memory strength) than
items not in the issue if the subject was indeed exposed
to the issue, though there could be some overlap between
the distributions. The distance between the means of the
two distributions is a measure of how far apart the two
are on the familiarity continuum. The likelihood ratio
expresses the likelihood that the particular item belongs
to the class of old items (actual ads) versus the likelihood
that it belong to the class of new items (distractor ads),
and if l{x) > p, the subject responds that he or she did
see the ad in the magazine issue in question. As a thresh-
old for saying "yes," P can be shown to be a function
of the individual's response biases, attitudes, and mo-
tives along with the prior probabilities of the occurrence
of the stimulus item in a given test. More particularly,
it can be shown that (see Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky
1970, p. 170-2) ^
p(n)
P(o)
where A is a constant of a proportionality and p{n) and
p{o) are prior probabilities that an item is a new (dis-
tractor) or old (stimulus) item, respectively. To see the
impact of a change in the prior odds of stimulus and
distractor items on p, consider Figure 1,B and assume
k = \.^ Assume further that the subject is using x^ (the
critical value of x corresponding to l(x) = P) as a cutoff,
that is, the subject is saying "yes, I have seen the ad
before" for all those items for which x > x^. The area
assumption that it = I implies that the payoffs for hits and
correct rejections are equal and the penalties for false alarms and in-
correct rejections are also equal. That is. correct decisions of each
type are rewarded equally and eiTors, regardless of type, are penalized
equally. In such a case, the individual would be motivated to be as
accurate as possible. The argument applies to both monetary, if any,
and psychic rewards. Thus if the respondent for some psychic reason
valued hits more than correct rejections, he or she would be more
inclined to say "yes"; it would no longer be 1 and the threshold for
saying "yes" would shift as well.
denoted A + C under the old distribution represents the
proportion of hits and the area A + B under the new
distribution represents the proportion of false alarms; area
D represents the proportion of misses and area E rep-
resents the proportion of correct rejections. When there
are equal numbers of stimulus and distractor items, p =
1 and the critical value of jr (i.e., x^) is the point where
foix) = fnix), that is, where the two distributions inter-
sect. Suppose, however, there are nine distractor items
and one stimulus item; the prior odds for an old item
would be 1 in 9. P would be 9, and \(x) would have to
be greater than or equal to 9 before the subject would
say "yes, the item is old." Similarly, if the odds are
60:40 in favor of old items, p would be .67 and \(x) ^
.67 before the subject would say "yes, the item is old."
In sum, when the odds are more in favor of old items,
a lower p is needed for a subject to say "yes" than when
the odds are against them. Conversely, if the prior odds
are unfavorable for the occurrence of a stimulus ad, the
evidence must be more substantial for a subject to con-
clude the stimulus ad is present.
In TSD terms, the p parameter is said to reflect the
subject's response tendencies and motivational states, for
example, whether the subject is aggressive for some rea-
son in saying "yes" or has yea-saying tendencies, or is
cautious or has nay-saying tendencies. It does not mea-
sure the true discrimination ability or sensory capabili-
ties of the subject. Rather, the individual's actual rec-
ognition memory is unaffected by his or her response
tendencies, but does change as the subject's memory ca-
pabilities change. According to TSD the distance be-
tween the means of the two distributions/.(.v) and/,(x)
provides a measure of sensitivity of the sensory system.
This distance, designated as d' (d-pnme),, is independent
of the decision criterion used by the subject and changes
only when there is a change in the subject's true sensi-
tivity with respect to his or her discrimination ability be-
tween old and new items. Because d' is the distance be-
tween the means of the two distributions/,(^) and/ , (A),
which are assumed to be normal with equal variance (see
Figure 1,C), d' can be calculated by the expression
where:
2FAR, the normalized deviate for the false alarm rate,
equals the number of standardized score units the
mean of the distractor item distribution is away
from jCf, and
ZHR, the normalized deviate for the hit rate, equals the
number of standardized score units the mean of
the old item distribution is away from x^..
A d' ~ 0 implies no difference between the means of
the distributions of the old and new items; in essence the
distributions lie on top of each other, indicating the sub-
ject cannot discriminate at all between the two types of
stimuli. Ad' > 0 implies the individual is basically able
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to discriminate between the old and new stimuli. The
greater the d', the better the discrimination. A «i' < 0
implies either (!) measurement error or (2) the subject
is performing the discrimination task and then giving a
contrary response, that is, saying "no" when he or she
should have said "yes" (and vice versa) on the basis of
discrimination ability. In other words, the subject is able
to perform the discrimination task, but is malingering
(Pastore and Scheirer 1974). - *•
Estimating j3 and d' . o, - .
Let us suppose a subject is shown 100 ads contained
in a folder, one at a time. One half of the ads are stim-
ulus ads in that they appeared in the magazine issue in
question and the other half are distractors. The subject
is made aware of the prior odds by being told how many
ads there are of each type. Suppose further that the sub-
ject's hit rate and false alarm rate in the recognition task
are 80% and 30%, respectively.
Consider what the subject's hit rate of .80 and false
alarm rate of .30 imply. The hit rate means that 80% of
the area under the old distribution is to the right of x^,
which is the critical value of the observation correspond-
ing to p. Similarly, the false alarm rate means that 30%
of the new distribution is to the right of x,. (see Figure
1,C).
The value of p can be estimated by looking at the ratio
of the ordinates at x^, that is, p = ordinate (HR)/ordi-
nate (FAR). Because the distributions are assumed to be
normal, the ordinates at x^ can be obtained from normal
probability tables and in this particular instance are or-





Consider next the estimation of the discriminability in-
dex d'. It can be estimated by calculating the difference
ZFM - ZnK, or the distance between the criterion point x^
and the means of the new and old distributions, respec-
tively.''
Because 30% of the area of the new distribution in the
example is to the right of x,., 20% of the area must be
to the left, between it and the mean of the new distri-
bution. Hence the distance between the mean of the new
distribution and x^ corresponds to a z score of .524 (i.e.,
ZjAR = .524). Similarly, because 80% of the area under
the old distribution is to the right of x,., 30% of it must
be between x^. and the mean of the old distribution. This
corresponds to a z score of —.842 (i.e., Zm = —.842).
Thus, the distance between the two means d' = ZFAR —
ZHR = .524 + .842 = 1.366. In other words, the capa-
bility of the subject to discriminate between the two classes
of events is inversely proportional to the total area com-
mon to the two conditional probability density functions.
In sum. TSD provides two parameters, d' and p; d'
is a measure of the true memory capability of the re-
spondent for a set of items whereas p is a measure of
the subject's response tendencies. Further, the two pa-
rameters can vary independently such as when there is
no real change in the subject's memory capability but
there is a change in motivation level (Banks 1970).^
When p is very low, an itetn needs little strength for him
or her to say "old." Consequently, the response will be
"old" very often, with the subject being correct on most
of the items that are aetually old but committing many
errors on new items. In short, there will be a high hit
rate, but also a high false-alami rate. If p is high, the
situation is reversed. The subject is very cautious, and
seldom says "old" unless he or she is quile sure—which
will be only tor items wilh high familiarity. There will
be a relatively low hit rate, for the subject will often say
"new" to old items, simply because of caution. On the
other hand, the subject will also have a low false-alarm
rate, because the response "old" will not often be given
to new items. Thus we see that if d' remains constant,
shifts in p will cause both the hit and false-alarm rates
to change, and in the same direction. As p goes up, both
hit and false-alami rate go down (Klatzky 1980, p, 249-
51). ... ,
Similarly, whenever there is a real increase in the mem-
ory for a given set of items (as would be expected if the
items were presented over and over) and there is no change
in the motivational state of the individual from one rec-
ognition test to the next, there would be an increase in
the hit rate but not the false alarm rate. The reason is
that the respondent's ability to discriminate between the
old and new items would truly increase.
Suppose the distributions neither are nornial nor have
equal variances.*" Then d' and p are no longer the ap-
propriate measures of the subject's ability to discrimi-
nate between the classes of events and the subject's re-
sponse biases, respectively. The statistics that are
appropriate depend on which assumptions do hold. When
the distributions are normal but do not have equal vari-
'Both d' and p values also can be obtained by using certain standard
published tables (see, e.g., Elliott 1964).
*If the equal-variance Gaussian model applies, the two paratneters
are necessarily independent. The normal and equal variance assump-
tions can be tested by using rating scale responses of the type used
in the empirical examples that follow. When the assumptions do not
hold, other statistics with meanings similar to d' and P are calculated
from a subject's responses. For the description of the procedures for
testing the assumptions and the statistics that should be used when
either or both assumptions do not hold, see Pastore and Scheirer (1974).
For a graphic demonstration of the independence of d' and p, see
Klatzky (1980, p. 249-51).
*Pastorc and Scheirer (1974) provide a useful overview of the sta-
tistics that should be used to estimate the discrimination abilities and
response biases of subjects under various conditions.
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ances, a parallel statistic (/' is used in place of d' while
P remains the same. When one does not want to make
any assumptions about the shape of the distributions, one
should use nonparametric measures of sensitivity and re-
sponse bias (Green and Swets 1966). More specifically,
the nonparametric measure A' can be used to assess the
subject's discrimination abilities and B^ to assess his or
her response tendencies. These parameters, too, can be
estimated solely from the subject's hit and false alarm
rates in a recognition task and their interpretation is
straightforward. Simple computation formulas for both
of these measures are given by Grier (1971).^ More spe-
cifically,
A' = 1/2 + iy- x)(l + y - x)/4y{\ - x),
B'u = I ~ x{\ - x)/y{l - y) for nay-sayers. and
.. B'M = yi\ - y)/x(\ - x) - \ for yea-sayers
where >' = hit rate and x - false alarm rate. A' can range
from .5 to 1.0 where .5 indicates zero recognition mem-
ory or chance performance and I.O perfect recognition
memory. B'H scores can range from -100% to +100%
where - 1 0 0 % represents maximum yea-saying and
+ 100% maximum nay-saying. B'^ - 0 indicates un-
biased response. Given our very limited current knowl-
edge about the shape of the two response distributions,
the nonparametric measures A' and B'H seem particularly
valuable for ad recognition experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1
To examine the potential usefulness of TSD for ad
recognition testing, we designed two experiments to test
several propositions. The propositions included both at-
tributes of the measures themselves and some expected
theoretical relationships.
Research Design
Experiment I was conducted among MBA students at
a large mid westem university. Students in the experi-
ment were given a portfolio of 48 ads and were asked
to evaluate each ad on a 7-point scale using descriptors
that ranged from "extremely rational" to "extremely
emotional." The disguise was used to help produce rec-
ognition memory decline over a relatively short peritxi
of time because prior research indicates a relatively slow
decay in recognition memory.
Subjects were given another portfolio of ads to eval-
uate three weeks later. Each of the new portfolios con-
tained the original 48 stimulus ads, but also 48 distractor
ads representing similar products, and was divided into
two parts. The first half had 24 stimulus and 24 distrac-
The nonparametric A' measure of sensitivity was suggested by Pol-
lack and Norman (1964) and the nonparametric Bi measure of re-
sponse bias was suggested by Hodos (1970).
tor ad pairs mixed at random. The second half aiso con-
tained 24 stimulus and 24 distractor ad pairs, hut ordered
in the same sequence as the pairs in the first half. Also,
the ads in the first and second halves of the portfolio
were matched in tenns of product category; thus, if the
randomly determined ad sequence had a cigarette ad first,
the first ad pair in the second half also involved a cig-
arette. Subjects were not made aware ol" this similarity
between the two halves of the pt>rtfolio. To them, it was
one portfolio with 48 stimulus and 48 distractor ads.
Subjects were asked to identify which ad in each pair
they had seen three weeks earlier when evaluating ads
as to their "emotionality-rationality." Subjects also were
asked to indicate the confidence they had in each rec-
ognition judgtnent, using a 5-point confidence rating scale
with end anchors "absolutely confident" and "absolutely
not confident." Subjects also provided an estimate of the
numher of magazines they read on a regular basis.
Thirty-two subjects completed both evaluations. The
responses of three subjects had to be eliminated because
those three had guessed the purpose of the experiment
when first asked to evaluate the emotionality-rationality
of the stimulus ads. The following analysis is based on
the responses from 29 subjects.
Results • '
Independence of the sensitivity and bias indices is im-
portant if one is to differentiate between the subject's
sensory capabilities and resptinse tendencies. To exam-
ine this issue. A' and B'^ scores were computed for each
subject by the formulas presented before and the corre-
lation in indices was computed across subjects. The cor-
relation equals .09, a result that is not statistically sig-
nificant Ip = .64) for a sample of 29, prompting the
conclusion that the sensitivity and bias measures are in-
dependent.
A second measurement issue explored with the data
was the reliability of the measures. Pastore and Scheirer
(1974) suggest it is reasonable to assume that the crite-
rion used by a single subject during any measurement
session (block of trials) is stable. In other words, in a
given set of trials, the response bias should remain sta-
ble. A high correlation was expected between the re-
sponse bias scores obtained in the first and second halves
of the recognition test. Also, because stimulus ads in the
first and second halves of the portfolio were selected at
random, there was no a priori reason to believe thai overall
memory for the ads in the two halves should be differ-
ent. However, evidence suggests there is an order effect
in recognition tasks, in that ads appearing toward the end
of the sequence are noted less (Frazen 1942; Lucas and
Britt 1963; Starch 1964). Thus, A' was expected to be
higher for the first half of the ads than for the second
half. Both expectations are supported. Across all sub-
jects, the average correlation between the two B^ mea-
sures is .70 (p < .01). The average A' for the first and
second halves is .78 and .73, respectively. Further, a
comparison of the raw hit rates across all subjects shows
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an 8% decline in recognition scores from .65 for the first
half to .57 for the second, which supports the order ef-
fect notion.
A third issue explored with the data was the relation-
ship, if any, between the bias measure and the number
of magazines read. Multimagazine readers have been
found to say "yes. I have seen the ad" more often than
persons who read less (Appel and Blum 1961). There-
fore, a negative correlation was expected between the
number of magazines a person reads and the person's
response bias measure, B',i. if the person is a nay-sayer.
The reason is that respondents who are conservative by
nature or who are nay-sayers have positive B'^ values.
As the number of magazines they "read" increases, so
does their propensity to say "yes," thereby lowering their
B'H value. The reverse would hold for yea-sayers. They
have negative B'^ values to begin with; an increase in
their magazine readership would increase their tendency
to say "yes." which would make their B'^ values larger.
Though the correlations are in the right direction for both
of these expectations, they are not statistically signifi-
cant. Twenty-two subjects have positive B'^ scores in-
dicating they are nay-sayers. The average correlation be-
tween these subjects" B'^ scores and the number of
magazines they read is -.09 (p = .70). For the seven
subjects with negative B'H scores indicating they are yea-
sayers, the correlation is .59 {p = .24).
The fourth issue addressed with the experimental data
was the relation between the sensitivity measure and the
average confidence rating across recognition judgments.
A number of studies have suggested that as the difficulty
of the recognition task increases, as would be the case
when the stimulus and distractor items are made more
similar, people tend to become less confident of their
judgments. Bower and Glass (1976) report, for example,
that subjects made significantly more errors and were
significantly less confident in their judgments on pairs
of items with structurally similar distractors in a forced
choice test. Tulving (1981) and Weaver and Stanny (1978)
report similar findings. Singh (1982) collected recogni-
tion responses of subjects in a 9-alternative forced choice
test over six weeks along with their confidence ratings
on a 3-point scale—"absolutely confident/ "reasonably
confident," and "not confident at all." He found that the
proportion of responses assigned to the "not confident"
category increased from 24% in the first week to 47%
in the sixth week, whereas the proportion of responses
assigned to the "absolutely confident" category de-
creased over time from 57% in the first week to 24% in
the sixth week. Also, the percentage of wrong responses
was higher in the "not contldent" category than in the
"absolutely confident" category. These studies thus sug-
gest that a subject who is not confident of his or her
recognition judgments is more likely to be wrong than
right. In other words, there should be a negative cor-
relation between the average confidence ratings when a
person's recognition responses are incorrect and the per-
son's measure of recognition memory. The reverse is not
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true, however; a person who is very confident is not nec-
essarily right in his or her recognition judgments in that
the person may be confident for the wrong reasons. For
example, a person simply may be very high in gener-
alized self-confidence and may fervently believe his or
her recognition judgments are correct even when they
are wrong. In sum, our expectations were that (1) there
would be a negative correlation between the subject's
confidence rating that he or she has made a correct judg-
ment and the person's sensitivity measure A\ for those
items the subject answered incorrectly and (2) there would
he little correlation between the measures for those items
the subject answered correctly. Both expectations are
confirmed. The correlation between the mean confi-
dence ratings on false alanii responses and the sensitivity
measure is - .31 (p < .10). The correlation between the
mean confidence ratings on hit responses and the sen-
sitivity measure is only .01 (p < .99).
EXPERIMENT 2
We were encouraged by the results of experiment 1
that addressed issues fundamental to TSD's usefulness
in ad recognition testing. The findings that the sensitivity
and bias indices were both reliable but independent are
important. So are the findings that the response bias
measure behaves as expected with respect to magazine
readership, at least in a directional sense, and that the
sensitivity measure behaves as expected in relation to
subjects' confidence in their judgments. A key issue not
explored in experiment I. but which has important im-
plications for ad recognition testing by TSD. is how one
chooses the distractor ads for the test.
The issue centers on the notion that performance in a
recognition test depends not only on the memory for the
stimulus ads but also on the nature and type of distractor
ads used in the test. For example, if the subjects were
exposed to a set of stimulus ads and later were tested for
their recognition memory for those ads by a test in which
the stimulus ads were mixed at random with the distrac-
tor ads, by merely changing the distractor ads one could
obtain a different recognition score even though true rec-
ognition memory for the ads should remain the same.
The fundamental question is whether adjustment by A'
could account for the effect of the distractor ads on the
observed recognition scores. Experiment 2 was designed
specifically to address this issue.
Method
Three ad portfolios were prepared for experiment 2.
Portfolios 1 and 2 were the same as in experiment 1 —
portfolio 1 contained the 48 stimulus ads and portfolio
2 contained 96 ads—48 stimulus and 48 distractor ads
that matched the stimulus ads on a product category ba-
sis. Portfolio 3 also contained 48 stimulus and 48 dis-
tractor ads. However, the distractor ads for portfolio 3
represented completely different product categories than
those used for the stimulus ads. Portfolio 2 could thus
be called a "product category congruent stimulus-dis-
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tractor portfolio" and portfolio 3 could be called a "product
category dissimilar slimulus-distractor portfolio."
For experiment 2, 80 undergraduate students at the same
midwestern university were divided randomly into two
groups of 40 each. Subjects in both groups saw portfolio
1 and rated each of the stimulus ads as being rational or
emotional, just as they did in experiment 1. Subjects were
asked to come back later for a second session. Ten sub-
jects from group 1 and two subjects from group 2 did
not attend the second session. Subjects in group 1 saw
the product congruent portfolio and subjects in group 2
saw the product dissimilar portfolio. The data analysis
is based on the responses from the 30 subjects in group




The four issues investigated in experiment 1 were also
investigated in experiment 2 and the results were similar
across both groups. Again the sensitivity and bias in-
dices proved to be relatively independent, r = .31 (p =
.09), They also proved to be reliable; the correlation be-
tween the response bias scores obtained in the two halves
of the recognition test is .61 {p ~ .01). The A' scores
for the first and second halves are .81 and .76, respec-
tively. The correlation between the bias measure and
magazine readership is again in the expected direction,
though again not statistically significant; for the 22 nay-
sayers in the two groups the correlation is - . 3 2 (p =
.15) whereas for the 8 yea-sayers it is .13 (p = .76).
Finally, the relationship between the sensitivity measure
and the average confidence ratings is similar to that for
experiment 1. The correlation between the mean confi-
dence ratings and the sensitivity measure is - . 1 8 (/? =
.35) for false alarm responses and - . 0 3 {p = .87) for
hit responses.
The differentiating feature of experiment 2 is that it
allowed investigation of the impact of choice of distrac-
tors. The a priori expectation was that it would be more
difficult for subjects in group I than for those in group
2 to recognize the stimulus ads because of product cat-
egory congruence between the stimulus and distractor ads.
That indeed turned out to be the case. The average raw
recognition score across all 48 stimulus ads is 65.4% for
group ! and 77,7% for group 2. Further, the average A'
score computed across all subjects in each group is 79.1%
for group 1 and 89.7% for group 2, suggesting the rec-
ognition task is more difficult when the distractor ads
reflect the same products as the stimulus ads. In essence,
the manipulation worked.
The fundamental issue that needed addressing was
whether the corrections for response bias and discrimi-
nation memory worked. Because the portfolios seen by
subjects in groups 1 and 2 differed only in the type of
distractor ads used, there was no a priori reason to be-
lieve that memory for ads would differ between the two
portfolios. Stimulus ads that are inherently more mem-
orable should be perceived as such by subjects in both
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groups. This expectation suggests (hat if the raw rec-
ognition scores for each ad were corrected by B'^ to ac-
count for the response biases of subjects and by A' to
account for the differences in the distractor ads. the
ranking of the stimulus ads with respect to the adjusted
recognition scores should be the same in both groups.
To investigate this question, we adjusted the raw rec-
ognition scores for each stimulus ad in each portfolio for
B'H and A'. Next, we rank ordered the ads in descending
order from the highest scoring to the lowest scoring ad.
That step produced three separate rankings for the stim-
ulus ads in each portfolio, rankings ba.sed on (1) unad-
justed recognition scores, (2) S;,-adjusted recognition
scores, and (3) B'^- and >l'-adjusted recognition scores.
We then calculated Spearman's rank order correlation
coefficient for each pair of corresponding ad rankings in
the two portfolios. The correlation between the unad-
justed recognition scores is - . 4 5 , between the B'fi-ad-
justed recognition scores .85, and between the B'^- and
A'-adjusted recognition scores .92.
These cotTelations demonstrate that the adjustments
worked and that the adjusted scores are much more valid
than raw recognition scores. The correlation between the
ranks based on raw scores is extremely poor. It improves
dramatically when the influence of response biases is re-
moved through the B'^ adjustment. It improves still fur-
ther when the differences in recognition memory due to
the differences in distractor ads are removed,
DISCUSSION
Recognition has been a very popular but controversial
measure of memory for print advertisements, TSD offers
marketers a valuable perspective and useful tool for im-
proving ad recognition tests. The theory suggests that
subjects' recognition responses are affected by their re-
sponse tendencies and their discriminatory abilities. Both
of these characteristics can be measured for individual
subjects if one has a set of judgments from each subject,
some of which are right and some of which are wrong."*
To estimate the response bias parameter, B,,, and the
discriminatory ability parameter, A', for each subject, a
few minor changes will have to be made in the estab-
lished recognition testing procedures used by such syn-
dicated services as Starch/INRA/Hooper. The ads will
have to be removed from the test issue of the magazine
and put in a folder along with some number of distractor
ads. The subjects will have to be informed about the
^Another approach recently described in the marketing literature to
account for the response biases and discrimination abilities of subjects
makes use of the beta binomial probability model. It allows the es-
timation of the di.stribution of true discrimination ability over subjects
(Schmittlein 1984; Schmittlein and Morrison 198.1). but does not pro-
vide individual subject measures for response bias and discrimination
ability. The subject-by-subject measures seem to be very useful to
advertisers because they allow the adjustment of recognition of prer-
sons claiming to have seen the advertiser's product, which is. of cour.se.
the one in which the advertiser is most interested.
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presence and number of distractor ads in the test. Re-
moving the test ads from the context of the magazitie
has at least two advantages. First, it eliminates the pos-
sibihty of falsely recognizing an ad from the context of
the reading material. Second, the position of the test ads
can be rotated in a portfolio so that there is no order
effect (Lucas and Britt 1963).
Given the estimates B'H and A', several adjustments
can be made to the raw scores to make them more mean-
ingful. Consider first an adjustment for B'H. Because B'H
is a measure of how prone a subject is to saying "yes"—
independent of his or her memory for the ad—B'H can
be used for obtaining an index of recognition memory
for each individual that is adjusted for response biases.
Recall that B'^ is expressed as a percentage and that a
higher B'^ indicates a lovi/er tendency for saying "yes."
Therefore, given equal memory across two subjects for
the ads in a certain recognition test, a subject with B'^
= -20% is twice as prone to say "yes" on a given rec-
ognition test as a subject with B'H = - 1 0 % . Funher,
though B'H is computed across all ads presented in a test
session, it can be used to ascertain recognition scores
adjusted for response tendencies for individual ads be-
cause it is reasonable to assume that the decision crite-
rion (B'H) employed by a single subject in a given mea-
surement is stable (Pastore and Scheirer 1974), that is,
the response bias remains constant.
The adjustment is easy to make. The only requirement
is that B'H be computed for each subject in the test from
the person's hit and false alarm rates. The responses of
subjects claiming "yes, I have seen a particular ad" would
then be coded 1 and "no" responses would be coded 0.
The dummy variables would be multiplied by the B'^ val-
ues per subject, the products would be summed, and the
sums would be divided by the number of subjects to gen-
erate an average adjusted score per ad. These scores would
be response bias adjusted scores.
The response bias adjusted recognition indices seem
very useful for comparing recognition scores across sam-
ples in addition to their use in comparing recognition
scores for various ads within a given sample of subjects.
For example, a manager may be interested in knowing
whether an ad appearing in both the April and May is-
sues of a monthly magazine registered better recognition
in one month than in the other. Because normally two
different samples of subjects would be used to obtain the
recognition scores for the ads appearing in the two dif-
ferent issues, it is very likely that the samples would
differ in their response biases. Hence, a comparison of
unadjusted recognition scores may be misleading and the
comparison of adjusted recognition indices would be more
appropriate.
Consider next the additional adjustment for A' to re-
flect the notion that the recognition scores obtained in a
typical recognition test depend not only on the subject's
memory for stimulus ads and his or her response biases,
but also on the similarity between the stimulus and dis-
tractor items used in the test. The more similar the dis-
tractor ads are to the stimulus ads, the more difficult
would be the discrimination task and the lower the rec-
ognition scores. The A' adjustment accounts for the sim-
ilarity of the ads. The procedure one would use to gen-
erate this adjustment would parallel that used to generate
the response tendency adjusted index. More specifically,
the dummy variables reflecting the yes/no responses
would be multiplied by B'H and A' scores by subject, the
products would be summed, and the average value across
subjects computed. The index formed thus would logi-
cally be called a "global index" because it adjusts for
both response tendencies of subjects and similarity of
ads. Though the global index could be used to compare
recognition scores across subjects in a single testing ses-
sion, its most productive use would be in adjusting the
scores obtained across tests to sort out the impact of dif-
ferent degrees of similarity between stimulus and dis-
tractor ads as well as the inherent changing composition
of the samples of subjects used to secure recognition
scores.
All the adjustments mentioned reflect basic subject
differences. However, the indices are also capable of ad-
justing raw recognition scores for externally induced
contaminants affecting a subject's responses. For ex-
ample, the differences in the response tendencies in-
duced by interviewer differences in asking questions, or
in providing clear or ambiguous instructions, could be
adjusted by these indices. If the interviewers by their
behaviors caused respondents to increase in their own
minds the psychic value of a hit versus a correct rejec-
tion, this effect would show up in fi^-adjusted scores.
TSD also could be applied to recognition testing of
broadcast ads. For example, using self-administered
questionaires, Bruzzonne Inc., the only company that
performs such tests, collects recognition information on
a number of broadcast ads. Because these tests yield hit
rates and false alarm rates for individual subjects, TSD
could be applied to Bruzzonne data without any modi-
fications in their testing procedure.
One criticism that almost surely will be made of the
adjusted recognition indices is that they are not nearly
as interpretable as raw recognition scores. In one way
that argument makes sense. An unadjusted recognition
score has great intuitive appeal; the statement that 30%
of the sample group remembered seeing the ad can be
easily understood by the least sophisticated manager. The
statement that the ad's response bias adjusted recogni-
tion score is .8, say, is not as easily interpreted. The
problem, though, does not represent a fundamental de-
ficiency in the index, just limited experience in using it.
As researchers gather experience with these indices, they
can begin to generate distributions reflecting the fre-
quency with which the various values occur. By refer-
encing subsequent values of the indices to the distribu-
tions, one would have an equally interpretable measure;
thus one could talk about the fact that, say, the empirical
evidence suggests a particular adjusted index value oc-
curs less than 70% of the time, suggesting the ad gen-
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erated a high level of recognition memory. This conclu-
sion certainly seems preferable to arguing that 70% of
the people claimed they saw the ad, but the number who
really saw it is not known because of false claiming ten-
dencies. In sum, norms that reflect the frequency with
which each value occurs could be developed for each
index. The norms eould be developed for specific types
of products as well as different media and different data
collection processes. In each case, referencing the raw
data to the appropriate norms would provide a mueh truer
indication of the recognition memory of an ad.
REFERENCES
Appel, Valentine and Miiton L. Blum (1961). "Ad Recogni-
tion and Respondent Set," Journal of Advertising Research.
I (June), 13-21.
Banks, W. P. (1970). "Signal Detection Theory and Human
Memory," Psychological Bulletin. 74 (August), 81-99.
Bower, G. H. and A. L. Glass (1976), "Structural Limits and
the Reintegrative Power of Picture Fragments," Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 2
(July). 456-66. '
Clancy, K. J., L. E. Ostlund, andG. A. Wyner(1979), "False
Reporting of Magazine Readership," Journal of Advertising
Research, 19 (October), 23-30.
Coombs, C. H., R. M. Dawes, and A. Tversky (1970), Math-
ematical Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
Corso. J. F. (1967), The Experimental Psychology of Sensory
Behavior. New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
Cronbach, L. J. (1950), "Further Evidence on Response Sets
and Test Design," Educational and Psychological Mea-
surement, 10 (Spring), 3-31.
Davenport, J. S., E. B. Parker, and S. A. Smith (1962),
"Measuring Readership of Newspaper Advertisements,"
Journal of Advertising Research. 2 (December), 2-9 .
Egan. J. P. and F. R. Clarke (1966), "Psychophysics and Sig-
nal Detection." in J. B. Sidowski, ed. Experimental Meth-
ods and Instrumentation in Psychology. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Company.
Elliott, P. B. (1964), "Tables of d'," m Signal Detection and
Recognition by Human Observers. J. A. Swets, ed. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Frazen. R. (1942). "Inequalities Which Affect Scores on Ad-
vertisements," Journal of Marketing. 6 (April), 128-32.
Glass. A. L., K. J. Holyoak, and J. L. Santa (1979). Cog-
nition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Com-
pany.
Green. D. M. and J. A. Swets (1966), Signal Detection The-
ory and Psychophysics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, (nc.
Grier, J. B. (I97I), "Nonparametric Indexes for Sensitivity
and Bias: Computing Formulas," Psychological Bulletin. 75
(June) 424-9.
Guilford, J. P. (1967), "Response Biases and Response Sets,"
in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, Martin
Fishbein, ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc.
Hodos, W. (1970). "A Nonparametric Index of Response Bias
for Use in Detection and Recognition Experiments," Psy-
chological Bulletin. 74 (November), 351-4.
Klatzky, R. L. (1980). Human Memory: Structures and Pro-
cesses. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Company.
Lucas, D. B. (1942), "A Controlled Recognition Technique
for Measuring Magazine Advertising Audiences," Journal
of Marketing, 6 (October), 133-6.
and S. H. Britt (1963), Measuring Advertising Effec-
tiveness. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Marder. Eric and M. David (1961), "Recognition of Ad Ele-
ments: Recall or Projection?," Journal of Advertising Re-
search, 1 (December), 23-5.
Moran, W. T. (1951a). "Measuring Exposure to Advertise-
ments," Journal of Applied Psychology, 35 (February), 7 2 -
7.
(1951b), "A Reply to Heller's Note," Journal of Ap-
plied Psychology, 35 (February), 78-9.
Neu. D. M. (1961), "Measuring Advertisement Recognition,"
Journal of Advertising Research, 1 (December), 17-22.
Pastore, R. E. and C. J. Scheirer (1974), "Signal Detection
Theory: Considerations for General Application." Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 81 (December), 945-58.
Peterson. W. W., T. G. Birdsall, and W. C. Fox (1954), "The
Theory of Signal Detectability," Transactions IRE Profes-
sional Group on Information Theory, 4 (September). 171-
212.
Pollack, S. and D. A. Nomian (1964), "A Nonparametric
Analysis of Recognition Experiments," Psvchonomic Sci-
ence, 1 (May), 125-6.
Schmiulein, D. C. (1984). "Assessing Validity and Tcst-Re-
test Reliability for "Pick K of N" Data," Marketing Science,
3 (Winter). 23-40.
and D. G. Morrison (1983), "Measuring Miscompre-
hension for Televised Communication Using True-False
Questions." Journal of Consumer Research. 10 (Septem-
ber), 147-56.
Simmons, W. R. (1961), "Controlled Recognition in the Mea-
surement of Advertising Perception," Public Opinion Quar-
terly, 25 (Fall). 470-71 (abstract).
Singh. S. N. (1982). Recognition as a Measure of Learning
from Television Commercials, unpublished doctoral disser-
tation. Ann Arbor, Ml: University Microfilms Intemational.
and M. L. Rothschild (1983). "Recognition as a Mea-
sure of Leaming from Television Commercials," Journal of
Marketing Research, 20 (August). 235-48.
Starch. D. (1946). Factors in Readership Mea.\urement. New
York: Daniel Starch and Staff.
Swets. J. A., W. P. Tanner. Jr., and T. G. Birdsall (1964),
"Decision Processes in Perception," in Signal Detection and
Recognition by Human Observers. J. A. Swets, ed. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Tulving. E. (1981), "Similarity Relations in Recognition,"
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior. 20 (Oc-
tober). 479-96.
Van Meter, D. and D. Middieton (1954), "Modem Statistical
Approaches to Reception in Communication Theory,"
Transactions IRE Professional Group on Information The-
ory, 4 (September), 119-41.
Wallace, W. P. (1980), "False Recognition Produced by Im-
plicit Verbal Responses," Psychological Bulletin, 88 (No-
vember). 686-704.
Weaver. G. E. and C. J. Stanny (1978), "Short Term Reten-
tion of Pictorial Stimuli as Accessed by a Probe Recognition
Technique." Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory, 4 (January), 55-65.
Wells, William D. (1961), "The Influence of Yea-Saying Re-
sponse Style," Journal of Advertising Research, 1 (June),
1-12.
